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Shinhan Bank’s delivery app ‘ddangyo’ has secured 8 million subscribers by positioning itself as a ‘lever of fairness’ in a highly entrenched oligopolistic delivery app market. The core of its success lies in a strategy that avoids capital-intensive competition and leverages the strengths of its core financial business. Along with lowering intermediary fees to 2%, ddangyo built a ‘cross-subsidy’ revenue model that connects non-financial data from the delivery ecosystem to profits in its core financial business, including alternative credit evaluation and lending. It quickly overcame its disadvantage in marketing capital through a ‘non-market strategy (B2G2C)’ aligned with local government regional currency policies. Furthermore, it achieved strong ecosystem lock-in by realizing a ‘protocol economy’ through ‘same-day free settlement’ using the banking sector’s unique PG license. It was an innovation made possible by setting up an independent organization (CIC) within a conservative bank where the right to fail was explicitly institutionalized and agility was secured. The intense scale-up journey of ddangyo is a compelling proof case that goes beyond a simple platform new business and demonstrates the internalization of digital transformation (DT) capabilities by a traditional financial institution.

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At one time, the delivery app market was a stage symbolizing the ‘innovativeness of platform business.’ It clearly demonstrated how a massive market could be created when online platforms combined with the offline real economy. However, the clock of innovation does not run forever. As the market grew in size and massive capital investments followed, the rules of competition shifted into a ‘war of money.’ Was it due to the winner-takes-all nature of platform business? A fierce war of attrition unfolded among leading companies such as Baedal Minjok, Yogiyo, and Coupang Eats. The monopolistic competitive structure became entrenched to the point where new platforms found it difficult to gain a foothold. Giant platform companies poured in more capital and staked everything on securing user share. At the same time, to cover the marketing costs involved, they began to heavily pressure restaurants and riders, another group of stakeholders in the delivery app ecosystem, through various pricing models and fees. A market where various startups once competed in innovation was eventually reorganized into a ‘two strong and one mid-tier’ structure centered on Baedal Minjok, Coupang Eats, and Yogiyo, all of which possessed strong capital power.

However, in 2026, a meaningful crack appeared in the fortress wall built by capital. The one that created this opening was the public delivery app ‘ddangyo’ launched by Shinhan Bank in 2022. Even at the early stage of its launch, the dominant view was ‘what kind of delivery app platform business is a bank doing?’ There was strong skepticism about how a commercial bank, not a distribution, logistics, or IT company, could compete with giant platforms that had already dominated the market. At the time, the proliferation of public delivery apps led by local governments also made the outlook for ddangyo uncertain. Although it offered a clearly lower fee rate than existing delivery apps, it was largely ignored by both consumers and restaurants due to its significantly poor convenience.

However, five years later, ddangyo has become synonymous with public delivery apps. As of 2025, it has grown into the fourth-largest delivery app and the No. 1 public delivery app operator, surpassing 8 million cumulative subscribers, 300,000 affiliated merchants, and 937 billion KRW in cumulative order value. In particular, it surpassed a 7.5% market share in Seoul, the frontline of delivery app competition, overtaking Yogiyo to rank third. Within a duopolistic structure, it effectively played the role of a ‘lever of fairness (market corrector)’ in the ecosystem, checking fee increases.1 1Shinhan Bank estimated that from 2022 to 2025, it indirectly and directly returned financial benefits worth approximately 246.9 billion KRW to merchants and consumers. 닫기

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